

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 TRSE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BERLIN 0475

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING CAPTION - NOFORN)

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, WB

SUBJECT: BERLIN POLICY ASSESSMENT

REF:

A. 11 FAM 212.4

B. BERLIN A-291, DECEMBER 23, 1973

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1. WE HAVE POUCHED TODAY BERLIN POLICY ASSESSMENT

PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW GUIDELINES (REF A).
ALTHOUGH IT IS ONLY THREE MONTHS SINCE SUBMISSION OF
1973 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT (REF B), EVENTS HAVE MOVED
RAPIDLY IN PAST THREE MONTHS, AND NEW FORMAL FOLLOWING
PARA LINES HAS ADVANTAGE OF RELATING PROPOSED COURSES
OF ACTION MORE DIRECTLY TO NATIONAL INTERESTS.

2. NATIONAL INTERESTS

STARTING FROM ASSUMPTION THAT DEMOCRATIC WEST GERMANY
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH US AND WESTERN EUROPE IS VITAL
TO STABILITY OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE, US BERLIN COMMITMENT
OF PRESENT MAGNITUDE IS JUSTIFIABLE IN TERMS OF SIGNI-
FICANCE OF BERLIN FOR COURSE OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS.
MOREOVER, QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT (QA) IS TEST CASE
FOR LESSENING OF TENSIONS IN EUROPE AND US HAS CRUCIAL
INTEREST IN ASSURING THAT AGREEMENT WORKS WELL AND BERLIN
PROBLEMS DO NOT OBSTRUCT NEXT STEPS IN DETENTE. MORE
TANGIBLE US INTERESTS IN BERLIN --TRADE, INVESTMENT,
AMERICAN COMMUNITY--ARE IMPORTANT BUT NOT IN THEMSELVES
SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT EXTENT OF OUR OFFICIAL PRESENCE.

3. GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE AFFORDS US GREATER FLEXIBILITY
IN REGARD TO GERMAN SITUATION THAN OUR WEST EUROPEAN
ALLIES, BUT WE SUGGEST WE SHARE WITH THEM--AND SOVIET
UNION--COMMON CONVICTION THAT ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT
HEAVY FOUR-POWER INVOLVEMENT IN BERLIN CARRY RISKS
AND UNCERTAINTIES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO RULE OUT
FUNDAMENTAL POLICY CHANGES. PRINCIPAL ACHIEVEMENT
OF QA WAS TO ADD STABILITY TO "DYNAMIC STATUS QUO:"
AGREEMENT DID NOT AND COULD NOT OVERCOME GEOGRAPHY
OR DEAL WITH CONFLICTING NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF TWO
GERMANYS.

4. IN EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE POLICIES THAT MIGHT LOOK
IN TIME TO ALLIED MILITARY WITHDRAWAL, ASSESSMENT
CONCLUDES THAT:

(1) EFFORTS TO INCORPORATE WESTERN SECTORS INTO
FRG WOULD BE DESTABILIZING AND WOULD BE MET WITH
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COUNTERVAILING SOVIET EFFORTS:

(2) DELIBERATE WEAKENING OF BERLIN TIES WITH FRG,
ACCOMPANIED BY SIGNS OF ALLIED DECISION GRANDUALLY
TO WITHDRAW, WOULD LEAD OVER PROLONGED PERIOD TO
INCORPORATION OF WEST BERLIN INTO GDR OR REALIZATION
OF INDEPENDENT ENTITY, AS ADVOCATED BY EASTERN
EUROPEANS, EITHER DEVELOPMENT COULD IRREPARABLY

DAMAGE US-FRG RELATIONS:

(3) ACCEPTANCE OF VIEW THAT QA IMPOSED FREEZE ON WEST BERLIN'S TIES WITH FRG, FAR FROM MAINTAINING STATUS QUO, WOULD FEED DOUBTS ABOUT ULTIMATE ALLIED INTENTIONS, WHILE PLAYING INTO SOVIET HANDS.

5. UK AND FRANCE ARE DISINCLINED TO SEE WEST BERLIN-FRG TIES DEVELOPED EVEN TO EXTENT US HAS REGARDED AS LEGITIMATE, AND THEY APPEAR COMMITTED TO SUSTAINING A DIVIDED GERMANY--FACTORS THAT ACT AS FURTHER RESTRAINTS ON US FREEDOM TO MOVE TOWARD EITHER OF FIRST TWO ALTERNATIVES. SOVIET UNION, WHILE COMMITTED TO "INDEPENDENT WESTBERLIN." SHARES INTEREST IN SEEING NEITHER FRG NOR GDR UNDULY STRENGTHENED. ACCORDINLY, SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO PUT LIMITS ON GDR PRESSURES ON WEST BERLIN, BOTH TO AVOID UNDULY STRENGTHENING GDR AND TO RETAIN LEVERAGE IN DEVELOPING FRG POLICY.

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6. WITHIN FRG THERE IS RISK THAT ALLIES WILL FROM TIME TO TIME BE ATTACKED FOR ADVOCATING STATUS QUO AGAINST GERMAN WILL, BOTH BY POLITICIANS INTERESTED IN INCORPORATING WEST BERLIN INTO FRG AND BY THOSE WHO SEE BERLIN AS OBSTACLE TO EAST-WEST GERMAN RECONCILIATION. NEITHER GROUP, HOWEVER, IS LIKELY TO HAVE ITS VIEWS ACCEPTED AS NATIONAL POLICY OVER NEXT 12-24 MONTHS, AND, DESPITE INCREASED DIFFICULTIES THEY WILL CAUSE, US SHOULD BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN ITS BASIC BERLIN POSITION.

7. KEY POLICY ISSUES

FOLLOWING ARE KEY ISSUES FORESEEN IN ASSESSMENT AS LIKELY
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TO ARISE IN NEXT 12 MONTHS, TOGETHER WITH PROPOSED
COURSES OF ACTION:

(1) SOVIET -GDR ATTEMPTS TO REINTERPRET PROVISIONS
OF QA, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO FRG-BERLIN TIES

EVER SINCE QA WENT INTO EFFECT, SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE REINTERPRETATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENT OF BERLIN TIES WITH FRG, WHICH US HAS REGARDED AS BALANCING PROVISION IN RETURN FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT CERTAIN FRG POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN. FOCUS OF ATTACKS HAS RECENTLY BEEN ESTABLISHMENT IN BERLIN OF NEW FEDERAL ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT QA'S CORE PROVISIONS ON VISITS AND TRANSIT ARE NOT IMMUNE AS POINTS OF PRESSURE. DEBASING OF QA ACHIEVEMENTS COULD AFFECT EAST-WEST DIALOGUE ON BROADER ISSUES AND, WITHIN BERLIN, ERODE CONFIDENCE IN US. OVER LONG HAUL, WE COULD LOSE VOICE ESSENTIAL TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS AFFECTING GERMAN QUESTION AS A WHOLE.

COURSE OF ACTION

INNER-GERMAN DISAGREEMENTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN FIRST INSTANCE IN INNER-GERMAN CHANNELS, BUT SOVIET PROTESTS DIRECTED AT ALLIES SHOULD BE ANSWERED PROMPTLY IN ORDER TO AVOID ENCOURAGING PROLONGED DEBATE OR LEAVING IMPRESSION OF WESTERN DISUNITY. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO UNILATERAL US OR

ALLIED PRIVATE APPROACHES TO SOVIETS IN CONTEXT OF
FULL PANOPLY OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN EFFORT TO
FORESTALL TROUBLE.

(2) HARMONIZING ALLIED-FRG POLICY

WITH SOME BONN LEADERS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTRO-
VERSIAL DECISIONS APPEAR AS FORCED UPON FRG BY ALLIES,
AND FRENCH AND BRITISH INCLINED TO RESTRICTIVE VIEW
OF QA, THERE IS RISK OF DAMAGING EXPOSURE OF WESTERN
DISUNITY.

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COURSE OF ACTION

ALLIES SHOULD INSIST THAT FRG AND SENAT TAKE FULL
MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISIONS THEY INITIATE
BEARING ON QA PROVISIONS, AND THAT THEY CONSULT WITH
ALLIES IN FORMATIVE STAGES OF PROPOSALS IF THEY EXPECT
TO HAVE ALLIED SUPPORT. US SHOULD COUNSEL AGAINST
LEGALLY QUESTIONABLE OR PROVACATIVE DECISIONS, BUT
SHOULD RESIST FRENCH OR UK EFFORTS TO ACCEPT UN-
NECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE QA INTERPRETATIONS.

(3) COPING WITH EFFORTS TO TREAT WEST BERLIN AS
SEPARATE STATE

SOVIET UNION, GDR AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, DIS-
REGARDING THE QA'S PROVISIONS, SUSTAIN A STEADY
CAMPAIGN TO SEPARATE WEST BERLIN FROM FRG IN INTER-
NATIONAL DEALINGS, SUPPLEMENTED BY GDR PROFFERS OF
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH BERLIN SENAT ON MATTERS OF
LOCAL INTEREST.

COURSE OF ACTION

FRG AND SENAT MUST ASSUME BURDEN OF COPING WITH
THIS CAMPAIGN, BUT ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFUTE
SOVIET AND GDR ALLEGATIONS THAT FRG IMCOMPETENT TO
REPRESENT WEST BERLIN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND TREATIES. SENAT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PROTECT
WESTERN LEGAL POSITIONS, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH
ALLIES, IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GDR, BUT ALLIES
SHOULD PERMIT PROPERLY CAVEATED AGREEMENTS TO BE
SIGNED ON MATTERS OF LOCAL CONCERN.

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(4) DETERRENCE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO ASSERT FOURTH
POWER ROLE IN WEST BERLIN

AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OF PERSONNEL OF SOVIET CONSULATE
GENERAL AND COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS SET UP UNDER
QA REFLECTS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SPECIAL TREATMENT AND
ESTABLISH SOVIET UNION AS CONSPICUOUS FORCE IN WESTERN
SECTORS ON PAR WITH ALLIES.

COURSE OF ACTION

ALLIES SHOULD RESIST ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN MORE FAVORABLE
TREATMENT THAN THAT OF OTHER CONSULTATES AND COMMERCIAL
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FIRMS, RESPECTIVELY, CALLING SOVIETS TO ACCOUNT FOR INFRACTIONS OF APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS.

(5) SUSTAINING IMPRESSION OF CONTINUED US AND ALLIED INTEREST IN-WEST BERLIN

CONFIDENCE OF WEST BERLINERS DOES NOT RUN DEEP, AND CHALLENGES TO QA, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO TIES WITH FRG, TEND TO STIR UP DOUBTS ABOUT CITY'S FUTURE. PROBLEM IS COMPOUNDED BY HOPES PLACED IN BRINGING NEW ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, TO WESTERN SECTORS, AS ONE OF MOST FEASIBLE MEANS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BERLIN'S HUMAN RESOURCES FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT. BERLINERS CONTINUE TO LOOK TO US IN PARTICULAR FOR THEIR BEDROCK SECURITY, AND AT THIS BREAKING-IN STAGE OF QA WOULD EASILY BE DISILLUSIONED BY INDICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN GARRISON FORCE.

COURSE OF ACTION

(A) POLITICAL DECISIONS RE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD REMAIN GERMAN PREROGATIVE, AND ALLIES SHOULD INSIST ON NOT BEING LEFT HOLDING POLITICAL BAG. ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER FEDERAL ENVIRONMENT AGENCY TO SHOW PACE, US SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN POSITION OF BANNING NEW PROJECTS THAT ARE CLEARLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER QA, AND SHOULD SUPPORT LESS-CONTROVERSIAL PROJECTS TO BRING INTERNATIONAL OR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS INTO BERLIN.

(B) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES FOR BERLIN, AND, WHILE PROTECTING INTERESTS OF US CARRIERS AND ALLIED AIR RIGHTS, SHOULD BE GENERAOUS IN GRANTING LANDING RIGHTS TO OTHER AIRLINES.

(C) SIZEABLE CUTS IN US GARRISON FORCE SHOULD BE AVOIDED DURING TRANSITION PERIOD RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT OF GDR INTERNATIONAL STATUS: REDUCTIONS SHOULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AT ADVANCED
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STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEN ONLY IF CRITICAL TO SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT.

(D) US SHOULD REPRESENT ITSELF IN WEST BERLIN WITH SUFFICIENT OUTSTANDING EXAMPLES OF CULTURAL LIFE TO

MAINTAIN REPUTATION WITH WEST BERLINERS IN LIGHT OF SOVIET STEPPED-UP CULTURAL OFFENSIVE IN WESTERN SECTORS, AND PROBABILITY US CULTURAL CONTACT WITH EAST BERLIN AND GDR WILL INCREASE.

(6) PRESERVATION OF ESSENTIAL ALLIED RIGHTS AND PRACTICES IN REGARD TO ACCESS AND EAST BERLIN

WITH ALLIED DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS STILL GETTING INTO PLACE IN EAST BERLIN, SOVIETS AND GDR, APART FROM SIDE-COMMENTS AND A FEW INCIDENTS, HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN MEASURES WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS CHALLENGE TO ALLIED ACCESS RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN EAST BERLIN. MORE CONCERTED CAMPAIGN MAY, HOWEVER, BE IN OFFING.

COURSE OF ACTION

ALLIES SHOULD INSIST ON COMPLIANCE WITH QUADRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 19, 1972, DESIGNED TO INSURE AGAINST TAMPERING WITH ALLIED RIGHTS, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE MINOR ADJUSTMENTS CONSONANT WITH GDR'S ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL STATUS, PROVIDED BASIC ALLIED INTERESTS ARE UNAFFECTED.

8. STAFFING PATTERN

(ASSESSMENT ALSO ADDRESSES FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN REVAMPING MISSION STAFFING ONCE EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN IS IN PLACE. KLEIN

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